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Abstract
This paper assesses the agricultural equipment industry through the perspective of the three leading
ﬁrms in the United States. It reviews the salient events of the 1990s and relates the business
environment to the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial performance. It then assesses the factors likely to impact perfor-
mance in the future, drawing on lessons from historical performance and on new environmental
factors. The ﬁrms’ capital market valuations appear consistent with the expectation that farm equip-
ment ﬁrms will resume growth after the farm recession. © 2001 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights
reserved.
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1. Introduction
Agricultural equipment has been a major contributor to the agri-food sector throughout
U.S. history. It has played a major part in the modernization of agriculture, consistently
improving farm productivity and commanding an increasing share of the economic value
added to farm produce. While agricultural equipment contributes a signiﬁcant share of the
value created in the agri-food sector, an important question is how much value the agricul-
tural equipment industry will contribute to the farm and food sector in the future. The
purpose of this paper is to examine trends and fundamental uncertainties in the business
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PII: S1096-7508(00)00028-8environment, their potential outcomes, and their related impacts on the equipment compa-
nies’ expected performance and value.
We review the prospects for the industry through the three leading farm equipment
manufacturers in the United States: Deere and Company (Deere), J.I. Case Corporation
(Case), and AGCO Corporation. These constitute three of the world’s four leading ﬁrms
along with the New Holland Corporation based in the United Kingdom. New Holland made
a bid in May 1999 to acquire Case, and completed a merger in November 1999 (becoming
CNH Global, N.V.). In 1998, Deere and Company was the largest equipment company with
total equipment sales revenue of approximately $11.9 billion (Deere and Company, 1998, p.
28). In comparison, Case and AGCO respectively generated total equipment sales revenue of
$5.7 billion and $2.9 billion in 1998 (J.I. Case Corporation, 1998, p. 42; AGCO Corporation,
1998, p. 28). AGCO has a distinct low-cost strategy, outsourcing more of its parts and
equipment production, with multiple brands (AGCO Corporation, 1996, p. 1).
A key issue for future performance is how much of farm production value can be
contributed by the farm equipment industry and how much of this can the ﬁrms capture as
proﬁts. This cannot be measured or reliably estimated, but we may be able to make some
general inferences based on expected ﬁrm performance. Equipment sales represent the value
of farm production appropriated by farm equipment industry. If these growth rates are
similar, and if return on investment to the farm equipment industry is constant then this
would imply no growth in the value contributed by the farm equipment industry. In this
study, we identify important factors and uncertainties that will affect future outcomes, and
provide an assessment of the prospects. We begin with a review of the general business
strategies and performance of the ﬁrms through the 1990s. We relate the competitive issues
to the historical ﬁnancial performance of the ﬁrms. Lastly, we examine opportunities and
threats that have the potential for a long-term impact on the industry business environment
and relate these to potential future performance.
2. Historical ﬁrm events and performance
To gain an understanding of the industry we evaluate the history and performance of the
three leading U.S. farm equipment ﬁrms. General historical ﬁnancial data for the three ﬁrms
back to 1994 are shown in Table 1. Table 2 gives more detailed information on the
performance of the three farm equipment businesses in the 1990s, and on the ﬁnance
subsidiaries for Case and Deere.
2.1. AGCO Corporation
While AGCO was formed in 1990, its formation can be traced to the mid-1980s farm
recession when, in 1985, the Allis Chalmers Corporation sold its agricultural division to a
German-based company, Klochner-Humboldt-Deutz (KHD). In 1988, KHD hired Robert J.
Ratliff as the president and CEO of Deutz-Allis because the company was struggling
ﬁnancially. With the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) and totalitarian regimes, management
perceived growth opportunities in Eastern Europe along with existing markets in Western
72 B. Bjornson, J. Klipfel / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review 3 (2000) 71–84Europe and Northern Africa (Barry, 1997; Nesbitt, 1990). In 1990, Ratliff led a management
buy-out whereby KHD sold Deutz-Allis to Ratliff and four other Deutz-Allis executives
(Barry, 1997). From the buy-out, Ratliff and his management team formed the AGCO
Corporation (acronym for Allis-Gleaner Corporation) and moved the company’s headquar-
ters to Duluth, Georgia (PR Newswire, 1990). AGCO has become one of the largest
agricultural equipment companies in the world with signiﬁcant shares in many world
markets.
AGCO has developed a unique multi-brand line of equipment through numerous acqui-
sitions of ﬁnancially struggling equipment companies (Barry, 1997). Principal acquisitions
have been: Hesston (hay and forage equipment) and White (high horsepower tractors) in
1991 (AGCO Corporation, 1992, p. 17); Massey Ferguson North America and White-New
Idea in 1993; Massey Ferguson Limited in 1994; Spra-Coupe, and Willmar, as well as the
distribution rights to Massey Ferguson equipment in Argentina in 1998 (AGCO Corporation,
1998, p. 4, 1998a, b). Prior to its acquisition of Massey Limited, AGCO’s revenues came
primarily from North America (Barry, 1997). The Massey Limited acquisition doubled
AGCO’s sales and resulted in 57% of AGCO’s total sales coming from outside North
America (AGCO Corporation, 1994, p. 4). AGCO does not change acquired brand names
because it believes that many farm equipment customers are brand-loyal. As a result, by 1998
AGCO offered 17 different brands of equipment and had signiﬁcant market share in the
agricultural equipment industry (AGCO Corporation, 1998, p. 3; PR Newswire, 1993).
Complementing AGCO’s multi-brand strategy, the company has developed a unique
distribution network through its acquisitions. AGCO has designed its equipment distribution
network such that it encourages “crossover contracts” which allow equipment dealers to sell
many of the multiple brands of equipment that AGCO has acquired (AGCO Corporation,
Table 1
Historical ﬁnancial data of farm equipment companies ($ millions)
1998 1997 1996 1995 1994
AGCO
Sales 2,941 3,224 2,317 2,068 1,319
Net Proﬁt 57 241 167 175 81
Assets 2,020 1,807 1,405 1,062 896
Liabilities 1,008 799 626 473 420
Net worth 1,012 1,009 780 589 477
Case
Sales 5,738 5,796 5,176 4,937 4,262
Net Proﬁt 88 234 297 188 29
Assets 4,555 3,630 3,345 3,200 3,474
Liabilities 2,331 1,337 1,379 1,627 2,245
Net worth 2,224 2,293 1,966 1,573 1,229
Deere
Sales 11,926 11,082 9,640 8,830 7,663
Net Proﬁt 1,120 960 756 793 644
Assets 9,599 8,251 7,702 7,479 6,982
Liabilities 4,403 3,034 3,078 3,419 3,421
Net worth 5,196 5,217 4,624 4,060 3,561
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different brand-loyal customers.
Finally, a key element to AGCO’s strategy is low-cost manufacturing with the outsourcing
of a signiﬁcant portion of parts and equipment production (PR Newswire, October 23, 1997).
It has developed manufacturing systems based on a high proportion of relatively standardized
parts, many from outside suppliers, saving internal research and development costs. AGCO
often outsources production of its equipment by entering into joint ventures with other
manufacturing companies. These joint ventures are typically with other manufacturing
companies that AGCO has only partially acquired, or with companies to which AGCO has
sold acquired production operations. For example, in 1996 AGCO acquired all of Deutz
Argentina S.A., but in January 1998 AGCO sold 50% of the Deutz Argentina engine
business to Deutz A.G. who had agreed to produce engines for AGCO (PR Newswire,
January 5, 1998). By outsourcing much of its equipment production, AGCO can respond
more efﬁciently to changes in the demand for agricultural equipment, less burdened by large
ﬁxed asset investments (PR Newswire, October 23, 1997).
In 1998, the company experienced its ﬁrst sales decline (28.8%) due to the economic
crisis in Asia and weakened global demand for agricultural equipment (AGCO Corporation,
1998, p. 2). AGCO maintained positive proﬁts in 1998 which it credits to its outsourcing and
distribution strategies (AGCO Corporation, 1998, pp. 2–3). However, while outsourcing
Table 2
Historical performance of farm equipment companies in 1990s
1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990
Sales Growth
AGCO 28.8% 39.1% 12.0% 56.8% 121.5% 89.4% 14.6%
Case* 21.0% 12.0% 4.8% 15.8% 13.7%
Deere* 7.6% 15.0% 9.2% 15.2% 18.3% 13.2% 22.1% 213.7% 8.7%
Invested Capital Turnover (Sales/Beginning Invested Capital)
AGCO 1.71 2.26 2.09 2.61 2.31 1.90 3.20
Case* 2.12 2.33 2.16 2.08 2.60
Deere* 2.14 2.06 1.77 1.63 1.40 1.29 1.12 1.14 1.54
Return on Sales (Net Operating Proﬁt/Sales)
AGCO 3.0% 8.3% 7.4% 8.9% 6.7% 5.1% 3.4%
Case* 0.9% 3.3% 4.5% 2.9% 20.6%
Deere* 7.5% 6.8% 5.3% 6.8% 6.1% 1.7% 20.9% 0.0% 6.2%
Return on Investment (Invested Capital Turnover 3 Return on Sales)
AGCO 5.1% 18.7% 15.4% 23.2% 15.4% 9.6% 10.9%
Case* 1.9% 7.6% 9.7% 6.1% 21.6%
Deere* 16.0% 14.0% 9.4% 11.1% 8.6% 2.2% 21.0% 0.1% 9.6%
Return on Financing Investments
Case 11.5% 11.8% 15.0% 13.0% 8.5%
Deere 10.7% 11.0% 10.5% 14.5% 16.9% 15.3% 15.5% 14.5% 13.8%
* Results for Case and Deere for equipment subsidiaries only.
Finance subsidiary results shown in bottom section.
Note: AGCO became a publicly traded company in 1992.
Note: Case was spun off from Tenneco and became an independent traded company in 1994.
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and been surpassed by both Deere and Case. This is measured in terms of the asset turnover
ratio, an accounting measure of how much sales the ﬁrm generates from each dollar of
beginning investment (Sales/Beginning Invested capital; see Table 2). This decrease is due
partly to AGCO’s signiﬁcant acquisitions of ﬁrms having more internalized operations and
to medium-term inefﬁciencies of integrating new operations. Acquisitions have also bur-
dened AGCO’s turnover ratio by adding intangible asset investments in the form of the
acquisition purchase amounts in excess of the identiﬁable assets of the acquired ﬁrms (i.e.,
“goodwill”). This represents invested capital on which the AGCO must earn a competitive
return. AGCO has also invested in precision agriculture through its Fieldstar® system.
Despite the decrease in asset turnover, AGCO’s return on sales has held up well, and
AGCO’s overall return on investment has usually exceeded that of Deere and Case through
the 1990s.
2.2. J.I. Case Corporation
The J.I. Case Corporation was founded in 1842 by Jerome Increase Case, and soon gained
recognition as the ﬁrst builder of a steam engine for agricultural use. By 1970, Tenneco, Inc.,
of Houston, Texas, acquired Case and made the company one of Tenneco’s wholly owned
subsidiaries. In 1985, during the farm recession, Case acquired International Harvester and
so became the world’s second-largest agricultural equipment manufacturer. In 1986, Ten-
neco acquired Steiger Tractor, Inc. for Case, making it one of only two North American
equipment manufacturers to produce four-wheel-drive tractors with more than 200 horse-
power (J.I. Case Corporation, 1998a).
Coming out of the farm recession, farm income was reaching record levels by 1990. Yet,
most equipment companies were pessimistic about the duration of favorable conditions and
began to cut back on production. Case continued producing at high levels, however, which
hurt their performance as economic conditions did worsen (Egerton, 1991; J.I. Case Corpo-
ration, 1998a). By 1991, Tenneco decided to try and sell Case for one dollar to anyone who
would be willing to take it along with its $1 billion debt (Yates, 1995). There were no buyers.
Case next initiated a multi-year restructuring program at a total cost of $1.4 billion. It
reduced excess inventory, closed ﬁve of its twenty manufacturing plants, and reduced
employees from 30,000 to 17,000 by 1994 (Yates, 1995). Case then sold the majority of its
company-owned retail stores to independent dealers whom it believed could market and
distribute the company’s products more efﬁciently (J.I. Case Corporation, 1994, p. 25). After
the second phase of Case’s restructuring program was implemented in 1993, economic
conditions began to improve and Tenneco spun off a majority of its interest in Case into an
independent, publicly traded company (Yates, 1995; J.I. Case Corporation, 1994, p. 21).
Case currently does business in over 150 countries. Case also manufactures construction
equipment, and offers ﬁnancial credit services (J.I. Case Corporation, 1998, p. 27). Case
seeks to produce technologically advanced agricultural equipment. In 1995, Case introduced
its precision agriculture technology, known as Advanced Farming System™ (Savage, Sep-
tember 27, 1995). In 1996, Case acquired Concord, Inc., providing Case with the best selling
air drills in the United States and with technology needed to integrate its Advance Farming
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1996; Business Wire, 1996). Also in 1996, Case increased its market share by acquiring both
(i) Austoft Holdings Limited, giving Case a new market entry into Taiwan, Thailand, and
Brazil, and (ii) Steyr Landmaschinentechcik AG, building Case’s business in Germany,
France, Austria, Switzerland, and Italy (Savage, 1996; October 1997; Chicago Tribune,
1996).
While Case has experienced some improvement and success from restructuring, it did not
yet earn a competitive return from the equipment subsidiary (contrary to its ﬁnancial services
subsidiary). As an independent company, Case’s return on sales and overall return on
investment lagged behind both AGCO and Deere (Table 2). Performance began to deterio-
rate in 1997 and 1998 due to the ﬁnancial crisis in Asia (J.I. Case Corporation, 1998, p. 2).
Performance declined further in 1999 in terms of both sales and proﬁtability as the industry
continued in recession.
2.3. Deere and Company
Deere and Company was founded in 1837 by pioneer blacksmith, John Deere. Deere is the
world’s largest manufacturer of agricultural equipment and has been the industry leader for
several decades. Headquartered in Moline, Illinois, Deere does business in over 160 coun-
tries and employs over 35,500 people worldwide. Deere also manufactures construction
machinery, lawn and garden equipment, engines, and other types of equipment. In addition
to manufacturing, Deere also offers ﬁnancial services.
Like Case, Deere seeks to provide its customers with technologically advanced equip-
ment. In 1996, Deere introduced its precision agriculture technology, the “GreenStar™
Combine Yield-Mapping System” (Williams, 1995; Deere and Company, 1995, p. 8). Deere
designed its precision agriculture technology so that it would be compatible with Deere
combines dating back to 1989, and has been offering the technology on its tractors, planters,
drills, and sprayers (Williams, 1995; Runningen, 1995). In 1997, Deere launched the ﬁrst
track tractors in the 160 to 225 horsepower range in which Deere claims to offer some of the
most technologically advanced features ever (PR Newswire, June 19, 1997).
Deere is more vertically integrated through greater internalization of parts and equipment
manufacturing relative to AGCO or even Case. This gives Deere greater control in its pursuit
to build advanced, integrated equipment systems. Deere’s acquisitions are far fewer than
those of AGCO and Case, and they tend more to be vertical rather than horizontal. For
example, in March 1999, Deere acquired InterAg Technologies, Inc., a supplier of software
components with capabilities in technologies that Deere uses (Deere and Company, 1999).
Vertical integration requires greater investment than outsourcing strategies, and this is
reﬂected by Deere’s historically lower asset turnover ratios in Table 2. However, Deere’s
turnover has steadily improved and surpassed AGCO in ﬁscal year 1998. Deere is consid-
erably larger than AGCO or Case, which affords greater scale economies. Deere has invested
in new manufacturing technologies and otherwise worked to improve efﬁciencies over the
past decade (Dunn, 1998; PR Newswire, January 29, 1998).
In addition to manufacturing technologically advanced products, Deere has long had a
distinct competency in customer service. Deere continues to develop its service and build
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force as marketing representatives on the basis that they could provide better technical
support to the company’s dealers and customers (Paley, 1994). Deere also developed a
customer database to better target marketing messages and better identify after-market
support service needs (Yeck, 1997). They have redesigned their distribution network with
centralized warehousing to monitor and respond more efﬁciently to dealer inventory needs
(Marchelti, 1998).
Deere has pursued international growth primarily through joint ventures, and marketing
and sales agreements rather than acquisitions. This is consistent with Deere’s strategy that
emphasizes more vertical integration and a single brand, and is distinct from Case and AGCO
which have pursued growth more through horizontal acquisitions. Deere has pursued markets
in the former Soviet Union, China, Brazil and Argentina, all key international growth
markets (Banham, 1996; Gunset, 1997; USA Today, 1999).
Table 2 summarizes Deere’s performance through a full industry cycle from the last farm
recession in the early 1990s to the current recession that began in 1998. Deere’s performance
in 1998 did not clearly weaken from the Asian recession and its lingering effects on world
crop prices and farm income. This is partly because Deere’s equipment division is more
diversiﬁed and includes construction equipment (as is Case’s). However, Deere’s cash ﬂow
declined in 1998 as proportionately more investment became tied up in working capital.
Further, ﬁnancial results and forecasts for the year indicate a clear downturn for 1999 (e.g.,
see Deere and Company, 1999).
3. Value and future performance
What will happen to these agricultural equipment manufacturers’ performance in the
future? While it is unpredictable, we can make some assessments of expected future
performance through the ﬁrms’ capital market valuations. Capital markets allocate wealth in
pursuit of ﬁnancial returns, and market valuations represent collective expectations of the
ﬁrms’ net future cash ﬂows. Because U.S. capital markets are efﬁcient at incorporating
information and knowledge into prices, resulting valuations represent relatively informed
and unbiased predictions about future performance (efﬁcient markets hypothesis; e.g., see
Brealey et al., 1999, pp. 322–335).
3.1. Market value measures
Table 3 shows the market value for each ﬁrm as of the last trading day of October 1999
(29 October 1999). The ﬁrst row of Table 3 shows the size of each ﬁrm in terms of the market
value of its equity, consistent with the order of 1998 sales levels. We can also see that AGCO
is the lowest valued ﬁrm by the standard scale-independent valuation metric, the Market/
Book equity value ratio (Market value of ﬁrm equity capital/Historical cost accounting book
value of ﬁrm equity capital). This ratio measures the extent to which the market values a
dollar’s worth of a ﬁrm’s equity investment at original cost (accounting-book value) (Table
3). This measure is analogous to Tobin’s q for total capital which represents the market value
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opportunities), plus (ii) the replacement value of total tangible capital, all divided by the
replacement value of the total tangible capital, q [ (Market value of total ﬁrm capital)/
(Replacement value of ﬁrm tangible capital). Based on the efﬁcient markets hypothesis,
q-theory holds that the effects of information relevant to the ﬁrm’s expected performance are
incorporated into its total market value, the numerator of q (Tobin, 1969; Brealey et al., 1999,
pp. 467–468). Tobin’s theory is that ﬁrms with higher q ratios can create more value from
additional capital investment and, so, will attract and invest more capital (strictly, q theory
holds for marginal q when different from average q; e.g., see Hayashi, 1982). Analogously,
Table 3 indicates that AGCO equity capital is valued by the market at less than its original
book investment cost. By contrast, Case and Deere’s equity are each valued more than book
value implying stronger future investment and return opportunities.
3.2. Relative value in terms of expected performance scenarios
We also use the ﬁrms’ capital market valuations as a benchmark to assess expected
performance through a conventional discounted cash ﬂow valuation model (e.g., Copeland et
al., 1996). The present value of the ﬁrm’s net cash ﬂows from a pro forma model of operating
and investment cash ﬂows are calibrated to the actual market value. Model pro forma
amounts are developed from benchmarks analyzed from the ﬁrms’ historical ﬁnancial
statements, including interim statements for the ﬁrst nine months of 1999. Model valuation
is ultimately determined by the discount rate, annual sales growth rates, operating asset levels
and related investment cash outﬂows, and cost and expense outﬂows and resulting after-tax
Table 3
Market valuation of farm equipment companies at October 29, 1999
AGCO Case Deere
1. Market value of equity ($ millions) $ 640 $4,120 $ 8,470
(price per share value in parentheses) (10.75/sh) (53.00/sh) (36.25/sh)
2. Market value of debt ($ millions) 795 1,956 4,151
3. Total market value of ﬁrm (equity plus debt, $ millions) $1,435 $6,076 $12,621
4. Market/Book equity value ratio 0.56 1.85 1.34
5. Present value of economic proﬁts/Total market value of ﬁrm 0.31 0.42 0.47
Note: Price/Earnings (P/E) ratios are not shown because they are not meaningful: AGCO and Deere both had
losses (no ratio); Case’s earnings were too small and yielded an extremely high P/E of 171.
Deﬁnitions:
1. Market value of equity 5 Number of common shares outstanding 3 price per share.
2. Market value of debt 5 total interest-bearing debt (non-interest-bearing liabilities are classiﬁed within
working capital; Copeland et al., 1996, p. 164, 168).
3. Total market value of ﬁrm 5 (1) Market value of equity 1 (2) Market value of debt.
4. [Market/Book equity value] ratio 5 Market value of equity/Accounting book value of equity (Brealey et al.,
1999, p. 467).
5. [Present value of economic proﬁts/(3) Total market value of ﬁrm] ratio indicates how much of the total
market value of the ﬁrm must be realized through extra-normal returns beyond the cost of capital, whereby
higher ratios indicate stronger expected future performance; for each period, Economic proﬁts 5 (Return on
investment 2 weighted average cost of capital) 3 Invested capital (Copeland et al., 1996, pp. 149–151).
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The cost of debt capital is estimated from company ﬁnancial statement disclosures on debt,
and the cost of equity capital is the market equity risk premium of ﬁve percent plus the
risk-free rate estimated from the long-term government bond yield (Copeland et al., 1996).
This equity cost represents a modiﬁed Capital Asset Pricing Model estimate whereby the
market risk premium applies to all ﬁrms (“beta” equals one for all ﬁrms) because measure-
ment errors can be signiﬁcant for single ﬁrm estimates and thus add noise with little
information.
While the ultimate reasons for expected performance and valuations are unobservable, we
can assess the relative differences in the expected performance that are implicit in the market
values. The pro forma valuation model parameters and values are calibrated so that the model
value equals actual market value. Thus, market value is an observable single summary
statistic of expected performance and risk, but with sub-components and driving factors
being unobservable.
Table 3 shows an expected performance ratio measure for each ﬁrm, Present value of
economic proﬁts/Total market value of ﬁrm. This ratio represents the present value of the net
returns in excess of the cost of capital (economic proﬁts or extra-normal returns; Copeland
et al., 1996, pp. 149–151), scaled by the total market value of the ﬁrm. The cost of capital
represents the beginning total capital balance multiplied by the weighted average cost of
capital. This ratio is higher if the ﬁrm has a higher expected return on investment and higher
expected growth, but is invariant to what combination of proﬁt rates and growth rates
achieves its market value. Thus, this ratio is correlated with the market-to-book ratio but is
more accurate since it is based on a full pro forma model that measures required ﬁrm
performance and accounts for expected dilution, gains and losses on asset transactions, and
book intangible assets that do not directly correspond to any direct replacement reinvestment.
By this measure, we see that Deere’s expected performance is comparable to Case’s.
3.3. Firm-speciﬁc value factors
While Case is valued highly, like Deere, its valuation is derived not entirely from
expectations of internally generated value. New Holland bid to purchase Case for $55 per
share which is over double the low price that Case reached in early 1999 (market price stood
at $53 per share on the October 29, 1999 valuation date in anticipation of the merger that was
completed in November 1999). A rationale for the higher valuation is that the merger would
allow distribution synergies from combining Case’s North American strength in heavy
equipment with New Holland’s complementary global franchise and dominance in light
equipment. Further synergies are expected from the merged operation reducing total annual
operating expenses by up to $500 million within the next three-to-four years (Raghavan and
Quintanilla, 1999). These efﬁciencies can result from scope economies in sharing of oper-
ations and distribution assets, or sharing knowledge and capabilities such as research and
development. The merger of Case and New Holland represents a consolidation that is
characteristic of slow growth industries in a recession. Consolidation may be required more
generally to maintain or build return on investment in the industry. After the last farm
recession, AGCO was essentially built from consolidation of numerous smaller ﬁrms with
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in the group. Case and Deere both have an advantage over AGCO in the current economic
climate in that they both have industrial equipment divisions. Although the Asian crisis also
affects industrial equipment, it did not hit this industry as hard as it hit agriculture.
The ultimate reasons for AGCO’s low valuation are not explicit. It is a smaller organi-
zation based on a newer business model, and has a high debt load with weaker credit rating.
Its relatively modest valuation may well incorporate greater risk, balancing (i) the possibil-
ities that it may grow more rapidly from a smaller base and prosper from its unique business
model with (ii) alternative possibilities that ﬁnancial stress over the next few years may
threaten its operations or even its viability. In sum, the market valuations imply less overall
conﬁdence in the future performance of AGCO.
Valuations of all three ﬁrms are below their fall 1997 levels when the Asian ﬁnancial crisis
began. Nevertheless, values are now consistent with the expectation that the industry leaders
Deere and Case will grow from the current farm recession and earn reasonable returns in
excess of the cost of capital. AGCO’s value appears to reﬂect greater risk of stagnant growth
without return improvements. We next look beyond ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors to identify some
fundamental forces in the business environment that appear to have the most potential to
change the industry.
3.4. Forces in the business environment
Precision agriculture is the next technological frontier in farm mechanization. Tradition-
ally, farmers manage cropping and inputs uniformly across whole ﬁelds. Soil fertility, pest
infestation and other production variables are managed by data on ﬁeld averages. Precision
agriculture incorporates variable rate technology that allows farmers to manage ﬁelds and
inputs more precisely by sub-ﬁeld plots. This involves integrating output information from
prior harvests with information on soil and pest characteristics, all developed through global
positioning system satellite technology (Runningen, 1995).
However, economic viability of the costly technology has not yet been empirically
demonstrated except in some high-value or high-input crops (Dealer Progress, 1998).
Generally, data and research on how to interpret information to support input decisions are
lagging. Also lagging is average farmer knowledge of information technology. It is uncertain
whether or when the industry’s investment in the technology, such as AGCO’s Fieldstar®
system, Case’s Advanced Farming System™, and Deere’s GreenStar™ system, will yield
signiﬁcant returns.
Signiﬁcant acceptance of precision agriculture may require substantially more research to
develop closer-to-optimal farm input decisions across much more numerous and narrowly
deﬁned conditions over different crops. Further, research may have to more clearly demon-
strate economic viability for farmers, and farmer knowledge of the beneﬁts will have to
increase. Viability may well be helped by the cost of the technology dropping as often
happens with information technology. Another inhibitor for farmer acceptance may be
“lock-in” whereby the products and their maintenance and upgrades are speciﬁc to the
manufacturer and related dealers for parts and service. If the technology becomes more
interchangeable or universal, a farmer could then deal in a more competitive supply market
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perhaps accelerate adoption. A further limiting factor in developing countries and much of
Europe where farm ﬁelds are small, is that precision agriculture is capital-intensive and will
be less attractive because it requires more supporting infrastructure and large ﬁelds.
An uncertainty related to precision agriculture is increased government regulation of
agricultural chemical pollution. Government regulations on chemicals have been getting
more stringent in the hope of maintaining soil and water quality, enhancing wetlands, and
protecting endangered species (Sunding, 1996, p. 1098). U.S. legislation in 1996 set uniform
pesticide tolerances for raw and processed foods that requires a “reasonable certainty of no
harm” deﬁned as a one-in-million chance of an individual getting cancer from a lifetime of
exposure to the food (Hess, 1996). Regulation is also becoming prominent in other countries.
For example, recent legislation in Denmark calls for a reduction in the amount of fertilizer
used in the country. The law requires farmers to cut fertilizer use by ten percent, establish
wetlands, and better use livestock manure (Agra Europe, 1998, p. N1). As chemical appli-
cation regulations have become more stringent around the world, they have also become
more complex. Precision agriculture technology has particular promise in managing and
complying with regulations. Increased regulation could lead to a position whereby farmers
can most economically comply with laws through the use of precision agriculture technology
that allows them to reduce applications in the most sensitive parts of ﬁelds.
In general, precision agriculture technology has the potential for reducing other farm
inputs. This effectively substitutes the technology for other inputs, allowing the farm
equipment industry to capture a greater share of farm value. Precision agriculture technology
also has the potential to complement new biotechnologies. For example, if seeds are
developed for speciﬁc soil types, precision agriculture would lever the value of such seeds
by more fully capturing the beneﬁts through site-speciﬁc seeding. However, despite the
promise, the medium-term obstacles appear to indicate that any signiﬁcant expected impact
of precision agriculture on equipment ﬁrm performance is uncertain and apt to be years off
into the future. This mitigates precision agriculture’s positive impact on expected perfor-
mance and current ﬁrm value.
World economic growth positively impacts farm income and, so, ultimately impacts farm
equipment demand. World commodity prices and farm income were relatively high during
the 1990s until the collapse of the eastern Asian economies that began in 1997. These
economies had been booming with large population segments moving into the middle class.
These segments signiﬁcantly consume more protein and upgrade their diets, and so have a
large marginal impact on farm output demand. As a result of the Asian economic crisis,
world agricultural commodity prices and farm income plunged while commodity inventories
rose (Tomkins, 1998; Waters, 1998). The Asian crisis is currently the central force within the
larger question of world economic growth, farm product consumption growth, and ultimately
farm income. Economic downturns in other emerging economies such as in the former Soviet
Union and Latin America have contributed further to the problem and its persistence. Low
farm income and pessimism about a near upturn have depressed demand in the historically
cyclical farm equipment industry.
In addition to world economic growth, another uncertainty in farm income is government
farm program payments. Government farm programs have represented about two percent of
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U.S. program is the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR Act or
“Freedom to Farm” Act), a seven-year farm subsidy program enacted in April 1996. The
purpose of the Act is to gradually move agricultural production towards a more free market
status, to eliminate planting restrictions, to decouple or sever the link between government
payments and the types and acreages of crops that farmers grow, and to provide decreasing
government payments over the life of the act by not setting target prices for agricultural
producers. The Act expires in 2002, at which time farm legislation will, by default, return to
the Agricultural Act of 1949, unless new legislation is passed into law (Paarlberg, 1999, p.
36). Currently, the government is moving towards additional aid during the current farm
recession, and there has been increased activism for farm assistance. However, there has long
been debate about the level of government support to farmers, further implying that the
extent of future farm subsidies is fundamentally uncertain.
If the United States retains agricultural supports in some signiﬁcant form, and if Europe
continues agricultural supports, then this should serve to support and stabilize future farm
income and consequent demand for agricultural equipment. Because agricultural equipment
manufacturing is otherwise a relatively cyclical industry supported by signiﬁcant ﬁxed
investments, more stable demand can lead to higher capacity utilization and a higher
long-term average return on investment.
4. Conclusion
The valuations of the three ﬁrms are consistent with the expectation that the industry
leaders, Deere and Case (and New Holland by implication from its acquisition of Case) will
grow and earn reasonably good returns on investment in the years ahead. Despite current
depressed industry conditions, the industry is expected to further reduce costs through new
efﬁciencies and consolidation, and earn returns in excess of the cost of capital during future
expansionary conditions. The farm recession may, however, cause another industry shakeout
that more threatens the proﬁtability of smaller ﬁrms.
Development of new products, such as precision agriculture systems, represents the
industry’s potential for adding new economic value. Precision agriculture technology has the
potential to substitute for other inputs such as fertilizer, herbicides, and other chemicals. It
also has the potential to complement new biotechnologies (e.g., site-speciﬁc seeds) and
Internet technologies to generate farm level research and knowledge. This complementarity
may stimulate equipment demand to the extent that biotechnology seed products succeed in
the marketplace at creating new economic value. As a result, precision agriculture could
allow equipment manufacturers to add more value, further substituting for labor as it has for
over a century and also substituting information technology for other inputs as is now
happening in many industries. Increased chemical regulation may further increase the value
(or share of required expenses) contributed by new equipment technologies.
While the potential for precision agriculture lies on the more distant horizon, economic
growth in developing countries may have a nearer-term effect. Economic growth in Asia is
picking up which will eventually increase farm demand, while the former Soviet Union and
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own agriculture, low cost manufacturers such as AGCO may be very competitive. In sum,
farm equipment manufacturing is not a “growth industry” in that its long-term growth is not
expected to exceed growth in the world economy. However, ﬁrm valuations appear consis-
tent with modest future growth being derived from still increasing economic value contrib-
uted at the farm level through new technology, and from increased farm demand resulting
from worldwide income growth.
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